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Abstract
The consumption-leisure choice model implies that an exogenous change in tax rates will
induce a change in labor supply. This implication is expected to be important to labor supplied
by secondary earners under a progressive tax system when spousal income alters effective
marginal tax rates. This paper examines labor supply responses to the income tax changes
associated with Japanese tax reforms during the 1990s. The results indicate that the hours-of-
work elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate is 0.8 for married women.
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1 Introduction
Consumer theory implies that an exogenous shift in the budget constraint will induce a change in
labor supply. Such a shift can occur by tax changes. Tax reform often alters incentives faced by
individuals and thus may alter their work effort. Behavioral responses to tax changes determine
not only the relevance of economic theory but also the deadweight loss of taxation and government
revenue. Estimating labor supply responses to tax rate changes is indeed one of the central issues
in empirical labor economics and public nance.
During Japan's so-called lost decade of the 1990s, the government implemented various in-
come tax cuts as a policy to stimulate the economy and as a by-product of political compromise
to introduce and subsequently to increase the consumption tax in Japan. As in many countries,
Japan maintains a progressive tax system, under which marginal tax rates go up in a stepwise fash-
ion as income increases. On the one hand, the cross-sectional variation in tax rates itself is not
considered exogenous because tax rates can vary according to hours of work. On the other hand,
when tax reform is implemented, a change in the tax schedule can generate a plausibly exogenous
cross-sectional variation in tax rates over time. A series of Japanese tax reforms during the 1990s
provides a good opportunity to identify the labor supply responses to tax rate changes.
Married women are most likely to be affected by Japanese tax reforms among all demographic
groups for several reasons. First, the literature suggests that male labor supply responses are zero or
small whereas female labor supply responses are measurable and possibly large (Pencavel, 1987;
Killingsworth and Heckman, 1987; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). Second, female labor supply
is low in their late 20s and early 30s, and many married women work part time in their late 30s
and 40s in Japan, whereas prime-age male labor supply is highly stable over the life cycle. Finally,
there is the spouse allowance system in Japan, which makes secondary earners in households
more susceptible to the effect of income tax. Under this system, households with low-income
secondary earners are eligible for greater tax deductions; thus, there has been serious concern that
married women work less and adjust their income so that the spouse allowance will not decrease.
This paper provides the rst estimate of labor supply responses in Japan to the changes in
tax rates associated with a series of tax reforms using the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers
(JPSC). The spouse allowance system also provides a useful source of variation in tax rates. A
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life-cycle model of labor supply is used to analyze the impact of tax reforms. After deriving an
intertemporal labor supply function, a simple solution is developed to solve the selection problem
in employment for the panel data model with endogenous regressors. An important advantage
of the approach here is that it can exibly allow for the unobserved heterogeneity that may be
correlated with the regressors.
The next section presents an intertemporal optimization problem and derives an estimable form
of the intertemporal labor supply function. Section 3 discusses the econometric problems that can
arise in estimating the labor supply model. Section 4 describes the key features of the Japanese tax
system and the 1990s tax reforms. Section 5 describes the panel data used in the analysis. Section
6 presents the empirical results. The nal section provides a conclusion.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 The model
Quasi-experimental studies typically use a static consumption-leisure choice model as theoretical
framework to analyze the impact of tax reforms on labor supply (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Moftt
and Wilhelm, 2000; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001; and Eissa and Hoynes, 2004).1 Eissa and
Hoynes (2004) describe explicitly a unitary household model in which the primary and secondary
earners sequentially decide hours of work. This study considers a dynamic model of consumption
and labor supply with uncertainty, although the assumption that married women are secondary
earners who make their labor supply decisions conditional on their husband's income is maintained
here, too, in order to exploit the variation in tax rates from the spouse allowance system in the
empirical analysis. Recently, Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac, and Meghir (2007) have developed
the collective model of household labor supply in which male labor supply is discrete and female
labor supply is continuous and possibly censored. The extension of the collective labor supply
model to an intertemporal framework is, however, left for future work. Moreover, the assumption
of sequential decision making made here seems a fair approximation of the actual decision process
1See also Moftt and Kehrer (1981) and Pencavel (1986) for experimental studies on the US negative income tax
programs in the late 1960s and 1970s.
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because more than 95% of observations in the JPSC sample are couples in which the husband
works full time and the husband's earnings are greater than or equal to the wife's earnings.
The conceptual framework adopted here is the intertemporal model of labor supply à la Heck-
man and MaCurdy (1980) and MaCurdy (1981, 1985). The model involves uncertainty because
most tax reforms are best described as once-and-for-all unanticipated shifts in net-of-tax wages in
the present and the future, as noted by Blundell andMaCurdy (1999). Denote by Et the expectation
operator conditional on an information set in period t. Assuming that preferences are additively
separable over time and between consumption and leisure, the intertemporal optimization problem
faced by married women is to maximize the expected value of the discounted sum of total utility:
E0
TX
t=0
(1 + ) t

uc (ct; s1t) + u
h (ht; s2t)

(1)
subject to the budget constraint:
at+1 = (1 + rt+1) at + (1   t)wtht   ct   ptqt; (2)
where  represents the rate of time preference, c is the consumption, h is the number of hours
worked, s1 and s2 are preference shifters, a is the asset, r is the net-of-tax real rate of return on
assets, w is the hourly wage rate,  is the effective marginal tax rate, p is an indicator that equals
one if the number of hours worked is positive and equals zero otherwise, and q is xed costs of
work.
A dynamic programming formulation of this problem provides a convenient framework for
characterizing optimal consumption and hours decisions. Dene V (at; st) as the optimum value
of the consumption-leisure choice problem given information up to period t. The value function
satises the Bellman equation:
V (at; st) = max

uc (ct; s1t) + u
h (ht; s2t) +
1
1 + 
EtV (at+1; st+1)

; (3)
where s includes all relevant state variables.
The optimal solution can then be characterized by rst-order conditions for consumption and
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hours, together with an intertemporal condition for the marginal utility of wealth in period t:
ucc (ct; s1t) = t; (4a)
uhh (ht; s2t)   t!t; (4b)
t =
1 + rt+1
1 + 
Ett+1; (4c)
where ! is the after-tax wage rate, and  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget
constraint. The derivation uses the result that the Lagrange multiplier equals the marginal utility
of wealth by the Envelop theorem. Equations (4a) and (4b) can be solved for consumption and
hours in terms of !, , s1 and s2 in the current period. The marginal utility of wealth () serves
as the sufcient statistic that captures all information from other periods that is needed to solve the
current-period maximization problem. The implied solution for hours is referred to as the Frisch
(or -constant) labor supply function.
To derive an estimable form of the labor supply function, consider the most popular parametric
form in the analysis of intertemporal labor supply. While the instantaneous utility of consumption
can remain unspecied, the utility of leisure is specied as an isoelastic function that exhibits
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) as follows:
uh (ht; s2t) =   exp

 f + kt + vt


 1
1 + 1

h
1+ 1

t ; (5)
where f is the time-constant unobserved taste heterogeneity, k is the number of young children,
and v is an idiosyncratic preference shock.2 Although the implied solution conveniently helps the
interpretation of the model, the isoelastic function excludes a corner solution. Given the fact that
some married women are not employed, to allow for a corner solution, consider an exponential
function that exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) as follows:
uh (ht; s2t) =   exp

 f + kt + vt


  exp

ht


; (6)
2Age and its square can also be included as taste shifters, but the estimating equation derived below remains
essentially unchanged.
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In the presence of uncertainty, the marginal utility of wealth can be written as:
lnt = Et 1 lnt + t; (7)
where  is the forecast error. The Euler equation (4c) can then be rearranged as:
lnt = t + lnt 1 + t; (8)
where t = ln
1+
1+rt
 ln (Et 1 exp (t)).3 The  term can be captured by a common macroeconomic
effect if  is identically distributed across individuals. Substituting backward in (8) yields
lnt =
Xt
=1
 + ln0 +
Xt
=1
: (9)
That is, the  term can be captured by a time effect that is common across individuals and a xed
effect that can vary across individuals. The forecast error can be decomposed as:
t =  4 ln!t + t; (10)
where  is a stochastic error component orthogonal to changes in the after-tax wage rate. The
parameter  represents the wealth effect because of unexpected wage changes and thus must be
non-positive.
The wage equation is specied in a way that is consistent with standard human capital models.
The lifetime wage path can be described by:
lnwt = a+ #t+

2
t2 + t; (11)
where a is the time-constant unobserved heterogeneity in productivity, and  is a idiosyncratic
productivity shock. The life-cycle wage prole is typically increasing and concave. In that case,
#  0 and   0.
3Equation (7) can be written as t = exp (Et 1 lnt) exp (t). Taking expectations yields Et 1t =
exp (Et 1 lnt)Et 1 exp (t), or equivalently, exp (Et 1 lnt) = Et 1tEt 1 exp(t) . Thus, t = Et 1t
exp(t)
Et 1 exp(t) .
The Euler equation (4c) in period t  1 can be rewritten as Et 1t = 1+1+rtt 1. Hence, t =
1+
1+rt
t 1
exp(t)
Et 1 exp(t) .
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Assuming the interior solution in the case of CRRA preferences, the conditions (4b) and (9)
lead to the Frisch labor supply function:
lnht = (f +  ln0) +  ln!t + kt + 
Xt
=1
 +

vt + 
Xt
=1


: (12)
This equation implies that, rst, hours of work are longer at the points of the life cycle when
wages are high. Second, hours of work can vary with taste shifters such as the number of children.
Finally, under the assumption that  is constant over time, hours of work decline over the life cycle,
if the rate of time preference is lower than the real rate of return on assets. Other things being
equal, hours of work will be longer in a period of deation and shorter in a period of ination. It
should be noted, however, that the wage rate and the interest rate vary concurrently according to
macroeconomic conditions. Disentangling the two effects on labor supply in aggregate data is thus
difcult. Micro data are generally needed to identify the labor supply elasticity.
The wage coefcient is the Frisch elasticity which measures labor supply responses to evo-
lutionary wage changes along the lifetime wage prole. The Frisch elasticity is known to be the
upper bound of the Hicksian elasticity, which is greater than the Marshallian elasticity when leisure
is a normal good.4 Moreover, the Frisch elasticity can overstate the impact of tax reforms because
it ignores the unexpected shift in wealth from a once-and-for-all change in net-of-tax wages, as
noted by Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).
The labor supply elasticity will not be consistently estimated when ordinary least squares
(OLS) is simply applied on equation (12) because 0 is unobserved but correlated with all wages
over the life cycle. When panel data are available, the marginal utility of wealth (0) and the per-
sistent preference heterogeneity (f ) can be eliminated by taking a rst difference. Substituting the
forecast error (10) and the wage equation (11) into the rst-difference equation of the Frisch labor
4Consider a static optimization problem in which an individual maximizes a CRRA utility function:
u (c; h; s1; s2) = g (s1)
1
1+ 1
c1+
1
   g (s2)  11+ 1 h
1+ 1 for   0 and   0, where g () is an unknown func-
tion, subject to the budget constraint: c = !h + y. Taking the derivative of the utility function with respect to h
after substituting the budget constraint leads to the rst-order condition: g (n)h 1 = ! (!h+ y)
1
 . This optimality
condition implies that the Marshallian elasticity is "m  @h@! !h

y
= [(1+)!h+y]( )!h+y and that the income elasticity is
"y  @h@y yh

!
= y( )!h+y . By the Slutsky equation, the Hicksian elasticity is "h  @h@! !h

u
= "m   !hy "y =
(!h+y)
( )!h+y . The Hicksian elasticity is greater than the Marshallian elasticity when leisure is a normal good. As seen
above, the Frisch elasticity is "f = @h@!
!
h


= , which is greater than or equal to the Hicksian elasticity. Therefore,
"m  "h  "f .
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supply (12) yields:
4 lnht = ( + )4 ln (1   t) +4xt +4et; (13)
where 4 represents the change in each variable between the two adjacent periods,  = ,
4xt = ( + ) (#  =2) + 4 kt + ( + ) t+ t, and4et = 4vt + ( + )4 t + t.
The coefcient on the log of net-of-tax rate ( + ) is the policy-relevant elasticity that accounts
for labor supply responses to parametric shifts in the lifetime wage prole. Again, cross-sectional
variation in tax rates over time is required to identify the labor supply elasticity.
Under the CARA preferences, the Frisch labor supply function can be derived as:
4ht =
8><>: (+ )4 ln (1   t) +4xt +4et if she works,0 otherwise. (14)
where  = , 4xt = (+ ) (#  =2) +  4 kt + (+ ) t + t, and 4et = 4vt +
(+ )4 t+t. The policy-relevant elasticity can be calculated by (+ )/h, where h is the
sample mean of hours worked among the employed.
2.2 Fixed costs of work
In the presence of xed costs, labor market participation does not simply follow the corner-solution
condition, as noted by Blundell, MaCurdy, and Meghir (2007). Instead, participation depends not
only on the determinants of hours worked but also on the components of xed costs, such as
transportation costs, child care costs, and job search costs that can vary by family structure and by
region. The decision to work follows from
V 1  V 0 (15)
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where:
V 1 = max
264 uc (ct; s1t) + uh (ht; s2t)
+ 1
1+
EtV ((1 + rt+1) at + (1   t)wtht   ct   qt; st+1)
375 ; (16a)
V 0 = max

uc (ct; s1t) + u
h (0t; s2t) +
1
1 + 
EtV ((1 + rt+1) at   ct; st+1)

: (16b)
The participation condition implies that higher xed costs decrease the value of, and lower the
probability of, working.
3 Econometric Issues
3.1 Instrumental variable method
Solving the lifetime utility maximization problem among the participants results in the rst-difference
version of the Frisch labor supply function (14), where the dependent variable is change in hours
of work and the explanatory variables include change in the log of net-of-tax rate, age, year dum-
mies, and change in the number of children.5 Age can be replaced with change in age squared.
The error term consists of idiosyncratic shocks in preferences, productivity, and forecast error and
thus may be heteroscedastic and serially correlated. Moreover, the error term may be correlated
with cross-sectional variation in the actual tax rates over time. Because the changes in tax rates
are associated with previous earnings, some of the variation can reect labor supply responses to
tax reforms.6 The rst-difference estimator, which is also known as the difference-in-differences
estimator,7 will not be consistent. In the presence of mean reversion, the change in hours of work
should be larger for workers who experienced a negative temporary shock in the previous year.
The estimated labor supply elasticity will then be biased downward. To circumvent this problem,
the approach proposed by Auten and Carroll (1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002) is used here.
5The constant term is redundant conditional on year dummies.
6This problem is similar to the one that arises in experimental studies of negative income tax programs (Keeley
and Robins, 1980; Moftt and Kehrer, 1981).
7Hall (1975, p. 127) presents a difference-in-differences approach to control for aggregate macroeconomic effects
in examining the impact of negative income tax programs.
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To control for mean reversion, the lagged hours of work is rst incorporated as an additional
regressor into the hours-of-work equation (14):
4hit =  4 ln (1   it) +4xit + g (hi;t 1) +4e1it for pit = pi;t 1 = 1; (17)
where x is the vector of observed attributes that includes the number of children under the age of
seven before compulsory education, the number of children aged seven to 15 during compulsory
education, age-squared, and year dummies, e1 is the error term, p is an indicator that equals one
if the individual is employed and equals zero if she is a full-time housewife, i is an index for
individuals, and t is an index for year hereafter. The labor supply responses to tax rates are denoted
by . To mitigate the bias arising from mean reversion, the effect of lagged hours of work is
nonparametrically specied. In practice, the unknown function g() is approximated by fth-order
polynomials. After making the exclusion restrictions tenable, the instrumental variable approach
is applied to equation (17). The instrument used here is constructed in a way that rules out the
variation in tax rates arising from behavioral responses.
z1it = (1  e it)  (1   i;t 1) =  i;t 1   e it; (18)
where e represents the net-of-tax rate calculated from the previous taxable income at year t  
1 under the current tax system at year t. In other words, e is the effective tax rate if the tax
schedule alone changes. Thus, the instrument (z1) indicates how the net-of-tax rate would change
in response to tax reforms without behavioral responses. The reduced-form equation for the change
in the log of net-of-tax rate can be described by:
4 ln (1   it) = 1z1it +4xit2 + g (hi;t 1) +4e2it; (19)
where4e2it is the error term.
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3.2 Sample-selection correction method
A potential problem with the approach above is the composition change of labor market partici-
pants. The estimated labor supply responses may suffer from a selection bias if the composition
effects are not fully captured by an individual xed effect, a time effect, and other observed at-
tributes. To correct for the potential selection bias, a simple panel-data model with an endogenous
regressor is developed here, building upon the sample-selection correction model proposed by
Olsen (1980).
We assume that the participation condition (15) can be approximated by an index function in a
linear form:
pit = z2it3 + xit4 + ai + e3it; (20)
where z2 is xed costs that vary by regional labor market conditions, a is an individual xed effect,
and e3 is the error term. The regional labor market conditions are specied as the interaction terms
between 47 prefectural dummies and nine year dummies. This specication is motivated by the fact
that xed costs, such as commuting costs, child care costs, and job search costs, vary across regions
over time. The idea to use the regional labor market conditions as excluded instruments is similar
to the one proposed by Blundell, Ham, and Meghir (1987). By virtue of linear specication, the
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity can be eliminated after the rst-difference transformation:
4pit = z2it3 +4xit4 +4e3it; (21)
For identication and estimation, the following set of assumptions is imposed on the model
presented above: (a) (p; x; z2) is always observed, whereas (h;  ; z1) is observed when p = 1. (b)
E [4e3j 4 Z] = E [4e3j 4 Z2] = 0, where 4Z = (z1; z2;4x; g (hi;t 1)) and 4Z2 = (z2;4x);
(c) 3 6= 0; (d) E [4e1j 4 e3;4Z] = E [4e1j 4 e3] =  4 e3; (e) e3 has a uniform distrib-
ution; (f) E [4e1j 4 Z] = 0; (g) 1 6= 0; (h) E [4e2j 4 Z] = E [4e2j 4 Z1], where 4Z1 =
(z1;4x; g (hi;t 1)).
Assumption (a) states the observational rule. Assumption (b) is necessary to estimate consis-
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tently the selection equation (20). Assumption (c) is the rank condition for excluded instruments.
The exclusion restriction is crucial for identication, as the sample-selection correction term is
a linear function. In other words, the sample-selection correction term is linearly dependent on
the other explanatory variables in the absence of an excluded instrument in the selection equation;
thus, the parameter  is not identiable. Assumption (g) requires the excluded instrument, which
is the predicted change in net-of-tax rates assuming that income remains the same as in the base
year, to be correlated with the log of net-of-tax rate.
Under assumptions (d), (e), and (f), it follows that E [4e1itj 4 Zit; pit = pi;t 1 = 1] =  4
e3it.8 Under the additional assumption (h), the hours-of-work equation can be rewritten as:
E [4hitj 4 Zit; pit = pi;t 1 = 1] = E [4 ln (1   it) j 4 Z1it; pit = pi;t 1 = 1]
+4 xit + g (ht 1) +  4 e3it; (22)
where the last term serves as the sample-selection correction term.9 In practice, the residual term
is interacted with the year dummies to allow for the differential effect of sample selection over
time. If the estimated coefcients on the selection correction terms differ statistically signicantly
from zero, the estimation suffers from selection bias in the absence of sample-selection correction
terms.
The estimation procedure requires only a linear regression as follows. First, the residual is
constructed after a set of parameters (3; 4) is consistently estimated via OLS regression of (21).
Then, the instrumental variable method is applied to estimate equation (22), where the residual
constructed in the rst step is included as the selection correction term, and a set of parameters
(; ;  ) is consistently estimated. Alternatively, instead of the instrumental variable method,
OLS can be applied to the rst-difference equation of (17) after the selection correction terms and
the residual constructed from the OLS regression of (19) in the presence of the sample-selection
correction terms are incorporated as additional regressors. The standard errors are computed using
a block bootstrap technique in which the sampling unit is an individual to allow for heteroscedas-
ticity and serial correlation.
8The derivation does not rely on the assumption that the error terms are jointly normally distributed.
9Card (1990) employs essentially the same approach.
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Importantly, the sample-selection correction model developed here can allow for an arbitrary
correlation between regressors and unobserved heterogeneity. As proposed by Semykina and
Wooldridge (2005), it is also possible to estimate the selection equation using a probit model un-
der the normality assumption. However, this specication requires the assumption that unobserved
heterogeneity can be expressed as a linear projection of observed characteristics. Moreover, our
method does not suffer from the incidental parameter problem, unlike the Tobit model analyzed in
Heckman and MaCurdy (1980). Another advantage is computational simplicity.
The distributional assumption for the error term appears to be strong, and it may be consid-
ered a disadvantage. In general, the drawback of the linear probability model is that the predicted
response probability does not necessarily fall within the range between zero and one. However,
the estimator is consistent as long as the mean independence assumption, i.e., assumption (b),
holds, and the prediction approximately overlaps between the linear probability model and the
probit/logit model around the middle of the distribution. Moreover, Newey (1999) shows that the
linear sample-selection correction model proposed by Olsen (1980) may provide a consistent esti-
mator under certain conditions placed on regressors, despite its misspecication of the distribution.
In other words, the uniform distribution assumption, i.e., assumption (e), is not necessary for con-
sistency, and it can be replaced by the set of conditions presented in Newey (1999). However,
this result does not extend to the non-linear sample-selection correction model, where the selec-
tion equation is specied as a probit or logit model. Therefore, which parametric assumption is
stronger is not denitive.
4 Institutional Background
4.1 Tax basis, deductions, and progressivity
As in many countries, income tax is imposed on individual taxable income, and the labor income
tax is progressive in Japan. There are several tax brackets, and marginal tax rates increase by
roughly 10% in each bracket. The number of tax brackets was ve until 1998 and decreased to
four in 1999. The maximum marginal tax rate then decreased from 50% to 37%. Labor income is
taxed separately from capital income which is taxed uniformly.
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Various tax deductions are permitted in Japan. Some tax deductions such as the allowance for
dependents can reduce the taxable income of either the husband or the wife, but not both. Thus,
spousal income can affect the marginal tax rate and the amount of tax liability. Moreover, the
amount of the spouse allowances varies with spousal income within a certain range of income.10
The rate of deduction for employment income varies with labor income from 5% to 40% when
gross income exceeds 1.65 million yen.
4.2 Spouse allowances
The spouse allowance permits individuals with spouses earning low incomes to deduct an amount
of tax liability. More specically, the sum of the spouse allowance and special spouse allowance,
denoted by SA, varies according to the secondary earner's income, denoted by IS , and is deducted
from the primary earner's tax liability as follows:
SA =
8>>>><>>>>:
SAmax if IS < c1 plateau,
SAmax  
 
IS   c1

if c1  IS < c2 phase-out,
0 if c2  IS;
(23)
where SAmax = 0:7, c1 = 0:65, and c2 = 1:35 million yen until 1994, and c2 = 1:41 million yen
from 1995.11 The phase-out region is generated by the decrease in the special spouse allowance.
The shape of the spouse allowance schedule looks similar to that of the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), as illustrated in Figure 1. There is, however, no phase-in region in the spouse allowance
system. This implies that the spouse allowance system does not create incentives but only disin-
centives to work.
Consider a household in which primary and secondary earners share a common budget con-
straint. The spouse allowance system alters the secondary earner's marginal tax rates as well as
the amount of the primary earner's tax liability in the phase-out region, because the deduction
amount for the special spouse allowance decreases proportionally with spousal income, as noted
by Akabayashi (2006). Figure 2 shows that the effective marginal tax rates of the secondary earner
10There is basically no variation in effective tax rates for those who have no individual labor income when individual
income is taxed separately from spousal income, and when labor income is taxed separately from capital income.
11The exchange rate of the Japanese yen to the US dollar ranged from 94 to 131 yen between 1993 and 1999.
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fall into four categories after spouse allowances are taken into account. The plateau region corre-
sponds to the rst income range, the phase-out region corresponds to the second and third income
ranges, and there is no spouse allowance in the fourth income range. Thus, the effective marginal
tax rate equals the secondary earner's own rate in the rst and last income ranges. In contrast, in
the second and third income ranges, the effective marginal tax rate faced by the secondary earner
equals her own marginal tax rate plus the primary earner's marginal tax rate, because the sum
of the spouse allowance and the special spouse allowance decreases at the same rate as income
increases.12 Although the basic allowance and the deduction for employment income lower the
individual tax liability to zero in the rst and second income ranges, the effective marginal tax
rate of the secondary earner is not zero but her husband's marginal tax rate in the second range.
The second and third categories of annual income ranged from 0.7 to 1 million yen and from 1 to
1.35 million yen, respectively, until 1994, and from 0.7 to 1.03 million yen and from 1.03 to 1.41
million yen, respectively, after 1995. The rst and last categories are outside these intervals.
4.3 The 1990s tax reforms
Five reductions in income tax were implemented during the 1990s, as summarized in Table 1. In
fact, a series of Japanese tax reforms in the 1990s signicantly altered the marginal tax rate for
many people. No tax reform relevant to this study was implemented between 2000 and 2002. The
structure of the income tax cuts varied in each case. Of the ve tax cuts, two were permanent, two
were temporary, and one included both permanent and temporary cuts.
Permanent changes were implemented in three ways. First, the tax brackets were changed in
1994 and reduced in 1999. Second, in 1999 the maximum tax rate was reduced from 50% to 37%.
Third, personal tax deductions, such as the basic allowance, the allowance for dependents, the
spouse allowance, and the special spouse allowance, were increased by 30 thousand yen in 1995.
Temporary changes were implemented in two ways. First, a 15% or 20% tax refund of the
income tax liability, called the special tax cut, was introduced temporarily in 1994, 1995, and
1996. In 1999, a 20% xed rate tax cut was introduced without a specied time limit. The upper
12However, individuals whose annual taxable incomes are greater than or equal to 10 million yen are not eligible
for the special spouse allowance.
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limits of the tax refunds in 1994, 1995, and 1996 were 2 million yen, 50 thousand yen, and 50
thousand yen, respectively. Second, in 1998, the xed amount of income tax refund was made
proportional to the number of dependents.13
5 Data
Theoretical and econometric issues have been discussed so far on the assumption that panel data
are available. The data used in the analysis are from the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers
(JPSC) from 1993 to 2002. A nationwide representative sample of 1,500 women aged 24 to 34
has been surveyed each year since 1993, and 500 women aged 24 to 27 have been surveyed each
year since 1997. The analysis of hours worked focuses on married women who report after-tax
income for at least two sequential years, along with their husbands, to calculate their tax rates. The
appendix provides details on calculating income tax. Respondents are excluded from the sample
if there are missing values or clearly inconsistent responses regarding employment status, hours
of work, and income. Based on these criteria, the sample consists of 3,070 observations from an
unbalanced panel of 659 married women. Full-time housewives are added when estimating the
sample-selection correction model, bringing the sample to 7,040 observations from 1,177 married
women.
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of the sample used in the analysis. There is consider-
able cross-sectional diversity in employment status and industry. The analysis here is not limited
to tenured or permanent employees. In particular, 53% of the employed are employed as part-
time workers, who can change their hours of work more exibly. The standard deviation among
part-time and temporary workers is indeed 36% higher than that among full-time workers. More-
over, year-to-year variation in the type of employment and industry are commonly observed among
married women. During the sample period, 19.6% of the 659 married women changed their em-
ployment status one or more times, 31.7% changed their industry one or more times, and 39.9%
changed either their employment status or industry one or more times. The JPSC collects informa-
13An interesting question may be whether and how labor supply responses differ in response to permanent and
temporary tax changes. One way of testing this question may be to examine the responses to only those tax changes
associated with permanent tax reforms. However, the distinction between temporary and permanent changes is not
obvious in all cases.
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tion about the allocation of time separately for weekdays and weekends. The number of weekly
hours worked used in this study is calculated from that information and may be more reliable than
the number calculated from retrospective information about annual hours of work. Comparing
the employed married women with housewives, the employed married women have slightly low-
income husbands and a small number of children under the age of seven. Importantly, 40% of the
employed married women are eligible for spouse allowances. Their labor supply behavior may be
susceptible to the effect of tax system.
Osano and Inoue (1991) and Beason (1993) raise the question of the applicability of the in-
tertemporal substitution model to the Japanese labor market. Both studies use aggregate data and
obtain mixed results. Some of the results in these studies are not in favor of the intertemporal
substitution model, but a failure to t the intertemporal labor supply model can be attributed to the
nature of aggregate data, as discussed above. During the sample period from 1993 to 2002, the
Japanese economy has been stagnant, which may bring up the same question. Yet, the unemploy-
ment rate stayed at 5.4% in 2002, although it increased from 2.4% in 1993, according to OECD
statistics. Moreover, this study is designed to better t the labor supply model to the data. First,
the analysis here focuses on married women whose labor supply tends to vary relative to other
demographic groups. Second, a series of tax reforms is used to identify labor supply responses.
Finally, the demand-side conditions in the labor market are incorporated in the selection equation.
6 Empirical Results
The results reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 are obtained by applying the instrumental
variable method to the rst-difference equation of (17) using the excluded instrument (18). The
results are presented in both the presence and absence of year dummies. In the absence of year
dummies, the constant term is included in the covariates. The standard errors and the test statistics
reported here are all robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. The parameter estimates
obtained here are consistent with the standard results in the literature (Killingsworth and Heckman,
1987). The estimated coefcient on the log of net-of-tax rate suggests a positive and moderately
large labor supply response. The effect of income tax on hours of work differs statistically from
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zero at the 5% signicance level in the absence of year dummies and at the 10% signicance level
in the presence of year dummies. A 10 percentage point decrease in the marginal tax rate increases
hours of work by 2.8 per week. The elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate is 0.81 at the
sample mean of hours worked. The number of young children decreases hours of work, although
the estimated effect is not statistically signicant. These results are robust to outliers in hours of
work. The joint signicance level of the fth-order polynomials in lagged hours of work is 0.00.
The results reported in column 3 are obtained by implementing the sample-selection correc-
tion method developed in the earlier section. In the estimation of the labor market participation
equation (21), the F-statistic is 58,13 with a p-value of 0.00 under the null hypothesis that all of
the coefcients on the excluded instruments are zero. This means that year-specic regional la-
bor market conditions provide the sample-selection correction terms with independent variation
and that the rank condition for identication holds. Then, in the estimation of the hours-of-work
equation (22), the 2 statistic is 7.84 with a p-value of 0.55 under the hypothesis that all of the co-
efcients for the sample-selection correction terms are zero, indicating no sample-selection bias.
The estimated tax effect is indeed identical to that in column 2.14
The correlation between the instrumental variable and the endogenous variable is strong in
the rst-stage regression of (19). In other words, the changes in effective tax rates are strongly
associated with the tax changes arising from tax reforms from columns 4 to 6 of Table 2. The
results indicate that tax cuts reduce net-of-tax rates, as expected. Under the hypothesis that the
coefcient of the excluded instrument equals zero, the F-statistics are 158 in the absence of year
dummies in column 4, 127 in the presence of year dummies in column 5, and 118 in the presence
of year dummies and sample-selection correction terms in column 6. The instrument used is strong
enough to make an inference for the nite sample.
Finally, given the result that no sample-selection bias can be found, the instrumental variable
method is also applied to the rst-difference equation in double-log form using the same instrument
in Table 3. The estimated parameters obtained in Table 3 are similar to those in Table 2. Overall,
the labor supply elasticities range between 0.81 and 0.83 in the presence of year dummies.
The labor supply responses of married men and unmarried women may also be relevant in
14These results hold even after prefectural dummies are added only in z2 or in both x and z2.
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determining the effects of tax policy. To examine their behavioral responses, the same analysis
was conducted separately for married men and unmarried women. This exercise reveals small and
highly statistically insignicant elasticities with respect to the net-of-tax rate for both married men
and unmarried women. Thus, the labor supply responses of married men and unmarried women to
the 1990s tax reforms appear to be negligible.
Labor supply responses to tax rates can vary with the income range. To examine whether
the responses to tax reforms are heterogeneous across individuals with different income levels,
the same analysis is conducted using subsamples split by income ranges. The results reveal no
statistically signicant differences between the subsamples. However, in part, this may be because
of a reduction of the sample sizes and of variation in tax rates after splitting the sample.
7 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to examine labor supply responses to tax rate changes. Various tax
reforms implemented in Japan during the 1990s were used as quasi-experiments to determine the
causal relationship between labor supply and tax rates. Although the effects identied by quasi-
experimental studies are considered to be plausible because the source of exogenous variation is
transparent, the quasi-experimental approach can be critiqued with regard to the economic inter-
pretations of the estimation results. Thus, an intertemporal model of labor supply was described
to clarify the interpretation and identication assumptions. The analysis of panel data using the
instrumental variable method and the sample-selection correction method indicates that taxation
has non-negligible disincentive effects on labor supply by married women. The ndings are con-
sistent with income adjustment behavior by married women who are susceptible to the effect of
the spouse allowance system.
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Appendix
Calculation of income tax
The marginal tax rates and the amount of tax liability have non-linear relationships with taxable
income and the number of dependents. The withholding tax table for monthly salary payments
reports the amount of labor income tax liability that corresponds to taxable labor income and the
number of dependents. The JPSC collects data on the monthly after-tax incomes of respondents
and their husbands, and on the number of children that they have.
Using the tax table and the data set, income tax is calculated as follows. First, the marginal
tax rates are calculated from the tax table, after both permanent and temporary tax cuts are taken
into account. Second, the after-tax income, which corresponds to the amount of tax liability, is
calculated as taxable income less the amount of tax liability from the tax table. Third, the number
of dependents for each individual is calculated from the data set. Children and a spouse earning
lower than a certain threshold are considered dependents. It is assumed that couples will deduct the
dependent allowance from the taxable income of the higher-earning spouse to gain a tax advantage.
Fourth, data on the marginal tax rates and the amount of tax liability from the tax table are matched
to the JPSC data on after-tax income and the number of dependents. Finally, the spousal marginal
tax rates are added to the marginal tax rates, and the amount of spousal tax liability is deducted if
the before-tax income falls into the second or third income ranges.
The sample distribution of marginal tax rates is summarized as follows. Among the 3,070
observations of employed women, the effective marginal tax rate is zero for 17.3%, greater than
zero but less than 0.1 for 68.8%, greater than or equal to 0.1 but less than 0.2 for 13.8%, and greater
than or equal to 0.2 for 0.001%. In fact, the various tax deductions lower the marginal tax rate.
The author recognizes the limitations of calculating income tax from the withholding tax ta-
ble for monthly salary payment. This table does not account for several tax deductions, such as
deductions for life insurance premiums, casualty insurance premiums, and buying a home, which
can be claimed as a year-end tax adjustment. However, more accurate approximation is beyond the
scope of this paper. The measurement-error problem can be alleviated by the instrumental variable
method.
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Table 1: The 1990s Tax Reforms 
Year Description of tax cuts 
1994 20% tax refund of the amount of income tax up to 2 million yen  
 
1995 Changes in tax brackets, expansions of various types of deductions, and 15% tax refund 
of the amount of income tax up to 50,000 yen  
1996 15% tax refund of the amount of income tax up to 50,000 yen 
 
1998 Tax refund of 38,000 yen plus 19,000 yen times the number of dependents 
 
1999 Changes in marginal tax rates and 20% cut in the amount of income tax up to 250,000 
yen  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 Variables Mean (SD)  Variables % 
Panel A: Employed married women 
Hours of work per week 35.3 (12.4) Employment status 
Monthly after-tax labor income of  Full-time worker 42.9
Married woman 12.4 (7.6) Part-time worker 53.2
Her husband 26.8 (9.8) Temporary worker 3.7
Age 34.0 (4.4) Non-response 0.2
Number of children  Industry 
Under the age of 7 0.60 (0.78)   Agriculture, forestry, fisheries, mining 1.0
Aged 7 to 15 0.91 (0.93) Construction 2.4
Aged 16 to 22 0.09 (0.35) Manufacturing 16.5
Educational background Wholesale, retail 26.0
Junior high school 2.8 Finance, insurance, real estate 7.5
High school 51.1 Traffic, communication 2.4
Career college 16.2 Electric, gas, water, heat 0.5
Junior or technical college 20.1 Service 27.7
University or graduate school 9.6 Public 15.7
  Others 0.3
Panel B: Housewives 
Monthly after-tax labor income of  Educational background 
Married woman 0.0 (0.0) Junior high school 5.9
Her husband 30.0 (12.4) High school 43.0
Age 32.6 (4.0) Career college 18.2
Number of children  Junior or technical college 21.7
Under the age of 7 1.16 (0.84) University or graduate school 11.2
Aged 7 to 15 0.59 (0.84)  
Aged 16 to 22 0.03 (0.21)  
Notes: The unit of income is 10,000 yen. 
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Table 3: First-Difference Instrumental Variable Estimates for Hours of Work 
Dependent variable:  Hours of work log of net-of-tax rate  
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
log of net-of-tax rate 25.9 28.2 28.2 –  –  –  (12.4) (14.6) [13.4] 
Tax reforms – – – 0.75 0.72 0.72 (0.06) (0.06) [0.06] 
# children aged 0–6 -0.34 -0.35 -0.27 0.00 0.01 0.01 
(0.64) (0.65) [0.67] (0.00) (0.00) [0.00] 
# children aged 7–15 -0.04 -0.04 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.60) (0.62) [0.63] (0.00) (0.00) [0.00] 
Elasticity 0.74 0.81 0.81 – – –   (0.36) (0.42) (0.38) 
Year dummies? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Selection correction terms? No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and square brackets are clustered at the individual level. 
Standard errors in square brackets are estimated by block bootstrap. The labor supply elasticity is 
evaluated at the sample mean of hours of work. Other covariates in the first-difference equation 
include the constant term, the change in age-squared, and the fifth-order polynomials in lagged hours 
of work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: First-Difference Instrumental Variable Estimates for the log of Hours of Work 
Dependent variable: log of Hours of work 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) 
log of net-of-tax rate 0.77 0.83 
(0.37) (0.44) 
# children aged 0–6 -0.02 -0.02 
(0.02) (0.02) 
# children aged 7–15 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
Year dummies? No Yes 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Other covariates in the 
first-difference equation include the constant term, the change in age-squared, and the fifth-order 
polynomials in lagged hours of work.
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Figure 1: Spouse Allowances 
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Figure 2: Spouse Allowances and Marginal Tax Rates (MTR) 
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